Different members of the ECB state that effects of monetary policy on banks’ profitability have been “broadly neutral”. Many also refer to papers defending that banks lend more under a negative rate scenario.
Here is a paper they use frequently trying to say that negative rates are good, do not hurt banks and makes them lend more: Why Have Negative Nominal Interest Rates Had Such a Small Effect on Bank Performance? (Lopez et al).
The paper ignores the collapse in net income margin and ROE and even dismisses ROTE (return on tangible equity) to try to defend the idea that banks earnings have not suffered from negative rates.
Looking at Bloomberg earnings from the Eurozone banks (SX7E Index) between 2014 and FY 2018:
The worrying part is that these statements ignore the fact that one of the main reasons why banks’ bottom line has not fallen more is they have almost stopped making provisions on bad loans.
There is no critical analysis of the rising risk in these central bank comments. The ECB and the above-mentioned paper assume a direct correlation between negative deposit rates and lending, without considering the risk of endless refinancing of zombie loans and the higher risk for a lower return embedded in the credit growth. Zombie companies have risen with low rates, and the ECB itself acknowledges the connection between weak banks and walking dead firms in this paper (Breaking the shackles: Zombie firms, weak banks and depressed restructuring in Europe).
It is also worrying that the ECB finds no problem seeing “high yield” companies borrow at an all-time low of 360 basis points spread or that bubbles are forming in the infrastructure and housing segments where multiples have soared in recent years despite the weak growth and modest salary and unemployment improvement.
What I find astonishing is that the ECB does not even show concern about the rise in malinvestment, whitewashing of populism by artificially lowering yields on the sovereign debt of deficit countries, misallocation of capital, and the abomination of charging for deposits to lend to almost bankrupt governments and firms at extremely low levels.
A version of this article first appeared on Conversable Economist.
Daniel Lacalle is one the most influential economists in the world. He is Chief Economist at Tressis SV, Fund Manager at Adriza International Opportunities, Member of the advisory board of the Rafael del Pino foundation, Commissioner of the Community of Madrid in London, President of Instituto Mises Hispano and Professor at IE Business School, London School of Economics, IEB and UNED. Mr. Lacalle has presented and given keynote speeches at the most prestigious forums globally including the Federal Reserve in Houston, the Heritage Foundation in Washington, London School of Economics, Funds Society Forum in Miami, World Economic Forum, Forecast Summit in Peru, Mining Show in Dubai, Our Crowd in Jerusalem, Nordea Investor Summit in Oslo, and many others. Mr Lacalle has more than 24 years of experience in the energy and finance sectors, including experience in North Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. He is currently a fund manager overseeing equities, bonds and commodities. He was voted Top 3 Generalist and Number 1 Pan-European Buyside Individual in Oil & Gas in Thomson Reuters’ Extel Survey in 2011, the leading survey among companies and financial institutions. He is also author of the best-selling books: “Life In The Financial Markets” (Wiley, 2014), translated to Portuguese and Spanish ; “The Energy World Is Flat” (Wiley, 2014, with Diego Parrilla), translated to Portuguese and Chinese ; “Escape from the Central Bank Trap” (2017, BEP), translated to Spanish. Mr Lacalle also contributes at CNBC, World Economic Forum, Epoch Times, Mises Institute, Hedgeye, Zero Hedge, Focus Economics, Seeking Alpha, El Español, The Commentator, and The Wall Street Journal. He holds a PhD in Economics, CIIA financial analyst title, with a post graduate degree in IESE and a master’s degree in economic investigation (UCV).