Ritesh is a corporate economist specializing in policy research and advocacy. He possesses in-depth knowledge of India's macroeconomic problems and policies, its complex regulatory regime including sectoral (e.g. agriculture and food, healthcare, infrastructure, real estate, textile) issues and concerns, geo-economical equations and external trade relations in particular with China, the EU and US. He has been advising Indian and foreign investors about the implications of changes in India's regulatory regime so that they can factor them into their commercial strategies. He analyses major developments in India's business and economic regulations with a multi-disciplinary approach involving economic, political and social dynamics in an increasingly globalized macroeconomic environment. He is a columnist for Nikkei Asian Review published by the Nikkei Financial Times Group and also writes for leading newspapers including Business line, Brink Asia, The Diplomat, The Economic Times, The Financial Express, The Huffington Post and Quartz.in among others. Ritesh holds a Master's degree in Economics from Banaras Hindu University and LLB in Law from the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi in addition to an advance certificate in trade and commercial diplomacy from the US. He's an alumnus of prestigious US Department of State's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). He tweets @RiteshEconomist
In the first part, I discussed how educational and economic empowerment of women has been eroding their bargaining power in India’s matrimonial market. As a result, grooms (or their families) expect (and often extract) some kind of premium or scarcity rent from the brides. Are brides or their families so helpless? Does economics provide any guidance on how women can improve their bargaining power in matrimonial market without compromising their career goals?
Ever wondered why does dowry (gift of cash, gold, luxury car or apartment from the bride’s side to the groom’s side) persist in India even if giving and taking dowry are a criminal offence in the country? Is there any economics behind this? Is dowry like a scarcity rent? Does relative bargaining position of Indian women vis-à-vis Indian men affect a woman’s ability to find her preferred match? Is marriage really a market?
Most people, especially Indians want to have their dream homes as soon as they can. Intense competition among banks (private as well as government banks) to acquire customers means it's easy to get a loan now than before. In addition, most people believe that property prices never fall. It's a belief...so no amount of reasoning can convince such people out of it.
The India-optimists opine that the negative effects of demonetization have subsided. Initial glitches in GST implementation are now over. Together Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) and National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) should put a check on bad loans despite the delaying tactics used by loan defaulters, and bank credit to the industrial sector will be back to normal.
India boasts about its demographic dividend, but this dividend cannot be taken for granted in the face of high rates of youth unemployment, underemployment, disguised unemployment and skill deficit-low productivity and low wages trap of the informal sector. And while India does have a large and growing number of graduates, their quality, skill and employability remain a serious concern.